Canada failed to counter Indian foreign interference

Justice Hogue released her initial report on Friday May 3, in which she concluded that "India directed foreign interference activities related to the 2019 and 2021 general elections". 

Canada’s Public Inquiry Into Foreign Interference wrapped up its first phase recently where a coalition of Sikh organizations shone light on the realities of Indian foreign interference and Canada’s failures in addressing this threat. The coalition was successful in uncovering government documents confirming clandestine Indian activities in Canada for the first time, as well as shining a light on the threat posed by Indian activities before the Commissioner. Alongside highlighting India’s operations in the national media, the questions raised by the coalition point to an alarming lack of action taken by Canadian government officials despite clear evidence of India’s covert presence in the country.

Readers can access the full submissions from the Sikh Coalition here.

Below is an edited excerpt from the coalition’s closing submissions to the Commissioner.

The record demonstrates that Indian diplomats and intelligence operatives are actively engaging in clandestine conduct to ultimately influence Canadian policy makers to adopt pro-India positions, as well as criminalize and prosecute any form of Sikh political advocacy in Canada under the guise of “countering extremism”. By conflating any expression of Sikh identity and any form of political advocacy critical of India with “extremism” writ large, Indian officials continue to misuse their diplomatic resources to overtly and covertly persuade Canadian decision-makers and institutions to criminalize and marginalize Sikhs in this country. 

The lack of decisive action to combat Indian foreign interference in Canada appears to be largely related to the fact that foreign policy considerations are often given greater weight than long-term domestic harms, particularly when the harm remains localized to a minority community. In the case of Indian interference, this lack of a meaningful response from Canada has further led to the continued marginalization of a minority community whose interests and democratic rights are being compromised and ignored in exchange for foreign policy objectives deemed to be of greater importance. The de facto impunity granted to Indian diplomats and intelligence operatives as a result, has emboldened Indian perpetrators of foreign interference and transnational repression, ultimately paving the ground for the assassination of Shaheed Bhai Hardeep Singh Nijjar in June 2023.¹

According to the intelligence documents, the Government of India views a broad range of political opinion as “fostering ‘anti-India’ sentiment, and thus as a threat to stability and national security in India.”² The GoI does not differentiate between these actors engaging in lawful political advocacy and those suspected of using force in the pursuit of an independent state.³ Upon a closer assessment of allegations that Canada does not take action against so-called “Sikh extremists”, it is clear these complaints boil down to a demand for Canada to clamp down on the fundamental rights and freedoms enjoyed by Sikhs in Canada—whether they are exercised in the form of pursuing or advocating for an independent state, Khalistan; criticizing India’s human rights record; advocating for the civil liberties of Sikhs in Canada; or simply celebrating the Sikh identity.⁴ While India has brutally cracked down on the Khalistan movement in Punjab using extrajudicial killings, enforced disappearances, torture, and arbitrary detention,⁵ vocal support for Khalistan remains widespread in Canada. India is known to regularly employ harsh counter-terrorism measures against political dissidents, human rights activists, and opposition parties domestically, and seeks a similar response from Canadian policymakers as well. 

Canadian decision-makers took deliberate steps to minimize and hide the severity of the Indian threat of foreign interference from Canadians 

Between 2018 and 2020, two reports have been produced by the NSICOP that directly addressed foreign interference, and Indian foreign interference more specifically. Unfortunately however, both tabled reports were clear examples of the government’s failure to ensure transparency and inform the public about the nature and severity of the threat. By redacting almost any or all information related to the nature of Indian foreign interference and Canadian actions that may have been taken in response, the relevant decision-makers–in this case, the Prime Minister and his advisors–severely undermined public transparency and widespread awareness of Indian foreign interference thereby eliminating the possibility of democratic oversight of the government’s action (or lack of action) in this regard. 

During the Prime Minister’s testimony before the Commission, he confirmed that the Prime Minister relies on public servants to suggest redactions and that he has the ability to ask questions and engage in discussion around the reasons for redactions.⁶ In the Prime Minister’s interview with Commission Counsel, he appears to have acknowledged that while the Prime Minister would not personally suggest redactions, Prime Ministers do have the authority to “push back against the public servants if they believe that the redactions are excessive.”⁷

The redactions to both NSICOP reports were made and maintained despite the express intention of establishing NSICOP to enable Parliament to hold the government to account for its decisions and actions taken in the national security and intelligence arenas.⁸ 

A. Special report into the allegations associated with Prime Minister Trudeau’s official visit to India in February 2018

Following public allegations of Indian foreign interference by NSIA Daniel Jean during the Prime Minister’s official visit to India in 2018, the NSICOP published a special report that looked at the circumstances of the events surrounding NSIA Jean’s actions and the allegation of Indian foreign interference. This was an important policy issue that received considerable public attention and was the subject of vigorous political debate as confirmed by members of opposition parties.⁹ In the absence of transparent communications about the nature of Indian foreign interference, serious public debate about the threat of foreign interference was replaced by partisan allegations between the Government and Opposition parties regarding the role of the NSIA.  

Indian foreign interference was at the heart of the issue as the Liberal government and members of the Sikh community in Canada were targeted by Indian disinformation using the consistent refrain of “extremism”. According to NSIA Jean, he took the rare step of directly briefing Canadian journalists in order to confront Indian foreign interference in real time. The NSIA had reviewed the sequence of events as well as intelligence to come to the conclusion that “there was a very high probability of an orchestrated disinformation campaign to tarnish Canada.”¹⁰ He repeatedly stated his briefings were meant to “counter what he believed were orchestrated efforts to fabricate a false narrative.”¹¹ The NSICOP noted the NSIA’s observations that:¹²

The “strategically released” media articles prior to the Prime Minister’s visit and Indian officials’ repeated raising of concerns around Sikh extremism and separatism, even after multiple efforts by Canadian officials, including the NSIA, to refute those claims, fit the pattern that the NSIA now saw emerging: an orchestrated attempt to ‘shine a spotlight’ on Mr. Atwal’s invitation in order to embarrass the Canadian government.

Underlying this controversy was the disinformation campaign suspected to have been manufactured by Indian intelligence that the Canadian government was “soft” on allegations that advocates for Khalistan in Canada were engaging in illegal activities by relying on the frame of “extremism”. The disinformation campaign specifically targeted the Canadian government in an apparent effort to trigger a more aggressive policy approach towards Sikh advocates for Khalistan in Canada. 

The NSICOP conducted an independent study to examine: i) foreign interference in Canadian political affairs; ii) risks to the PM’s security; and iii) the use of intelligence in the circumstances. Despite the public importance of this issue that impacted a broad swathe of Canadians and the express intention to assess foreign interference, the public report featured heavy redactions specifically with respect to Indian foreign interference.¹³ Most concerningly, all six findings with respect to the allegations of Indian foreign interference were redacted leaving little to no meaningful or discernible details about the threat posed to Canadians and Canadian institutions. 

B. Annual Report 2019

This report was submitted to the Prime Minister on August 30, 2019 and a revised version was subsequently tabled in Parliament in March 2020. This report included three substantive reviews completed by the Committee, including a review of the government response to foreign interference. The report contains substantive details and comments about the nature and threat of foreign interference in Canada, including specific case studies both on the nature and tactics used by different actors, as well as reviews of Canadian government operations in response to these threats. While explicit mention is made of both the People’s Republic of China, and the Russian Federation–alongside unclassified summaries of relevant information demonstrating the seriousness of the threat–significant portions of this report are redacted. According to media reports about the unredacted version, CSIS’s growing concerns about India were “completely redacted” for unknown reasons although China and Russia were explicitly named.¹⁴

In sections pertaining to the PRC and Russia, summaries describe the nature of the content that has been redacted offering readers some context and understanding of foreign interference while protecting the sources and methods of intelligence gathering or other sensitive details. Examples include:

• “The paragraph describes a CSIS assessment.”

• “The paragraph describes the objectives and tools of China’s foreign interference.”

• “The sentences describe tools of Chinese foreign interference.”

• “The paragraph describes a briefing to the Minister of Public Safety and Preparedness.”

• “The paragraph describes the objectives of Russian foreign interference activities.”

The third case study in this section is redacted in its entirety with no meaningful  information provided in its place to identify the source of threat activity, the nature of assessments made by Canadian S&I, or summaries of the objectives or tools used by the actor. 

The report subsequently reviewed specific case studies of government action taken in response to foreign interference between January 1, 2015 and August 31, 2018. While the report outlines actions taken against Chinese and Russian foreign interference while protecting sources and methods, the third case study is fully redacted and simply replaced by a note that the “paragraphs describe a government response to a specific country which has conducted foreign interference activities in Canada.”¹⁵ Media reports suggest that the third case study revolved around India and the government’s direction to CSIS to scale down “threat reduction” measures because the government prioritized trade and political objectives over security concerns.¹⁶

The decision to redact these details in their entirety from both reports is particularly alarming as this decision eliminated any possibility of public transparency or democratic accountability with regards to the government’s action and missed a key opportunity to simply acknowledge the threat of Indian foreign interference publicly at the very least. As a result, the Sikh diaspora has been left completely vulnerable, apparently in the pursuit of securing diplomatic relations and trade deals with a country actively engaging in “hostile state activity”.¹⁷ 

Conclusion

The impacts of Indian foreign interference in Canada reverberate far beyond the results of an election, and go to the very heart of Canada's democratic institutions and the meaningful exercise of Charter rights. As demonstrated by the evidence before the commission, the result of this threat has been that the ability of Sikhs in Canada to fully exercise their democratic rights and engage in electoral processes is tainted and compromised. And in the case of Shaheed Bhai Hardeep Singh Nijjar, the price of exercising the democratic right of freedom of expression–in spite of India’s threats and intimidation–was the brazen daytime assassination of a Sikh leader outside of one of this country’s most prominent Sikh institutions. 

Despite clear records of India’s concerted efforts to engage in a variety of foreign interference activities–including electoral interference, senior decision-makers have repeatedly failed to take adequate steps to confront this threat and instead opted to hide India’s threat-related activities and covered up the government’s inability to curtail India’s behaviour. As long as foreign interference and government responses remain entirely shrouded in secrecy and subordinate to foreign policy interests, diaspora communities and Canadian democratic institutions will both remain vulnerable targets of hostile foreign actors.

1. COM0000205, Chuck Chiang, CBC News, “Sikh protesters in Vancouver decry gurdwara president shooting death as foreign interference” (24 June 2023).

2.  CAN.SUM. 000007, CSIS Intelligence Summary, Country Summary: India at page 2.

3.  Ibid.

4. Transcript, Public Hearings, Volume 10, 4 April 2024, 208-220 (David Vigneault) at page 226, lines 10-20. 

5. Ensaaf. (2009). Violent Deaths and Enforced Disappearances During the Counterinsurgency in Punjab, India. [ENSAAF Organization]. Retrieved from https://ensaaf.org/publications/reports/descriptiveanalysis/

6.  Transcript, Public Hearings, Volume 14, 10 April 2024, pp. 246-250 (Justin Trudeau) at page 249.

7.  WIT0000066, Justin Trudeau, In Camera Interview Summary (27 February 2024) at para 30.

8.  CAN.DOC.000013, Institutional Report for PMO at page 3.

9.  Supra note 39.

10.  Supra note 11 at para 73.

11.  Ibid at para 74.

12.  Ibid at para 80.

13.  Ibid at pages 3, 5-6.

14.  Supra note 7. 

15.  Supra note 45 at page 95.

16.  Supra note 7.

17.  Supra note 46 at para 216.