Indian interference in Conservative leadership race

“CSIS intelligence indicates that the Government of India has engaged in Foreign Interference activities related to the leadership race...”

In his testimony before the Foreign Interference Commission today, National Director of the Conservative Party of Canada, Mike Crase, says he does not recall receiving any information about Indian interference in the 2022 Conservative leadership race. He also stated that he did not ask the Party’s designated representative to receive classified intelligence about whether he received any information on this issue–even after the allegations were published in a June 2024 NSICOP report.

When asked whether the CPC carried out any internal investigations or discussions regarding the allegations give the gravity and nature of the very public allegations, he simply stated: “we’re confident in our process and the hundreds and thousands of people that voted to elect our leader.”

Canada’s National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians (NSICOP) released a public report in June 2024, titled “Special Report on Foreign Interference in Canada’s Democratic Processes and Institutions.”

Paragraph 73 of the report was redacted and replaced simply by the following description—citing a 2022 CSIS document: “This paragraph was deleted to remove injurious or privileged information. The paragraph described India’s alleged interference in a Conservative Party of Canada leadership race.”

In a December 2023 story, Sam Cooper reported that an October 2022 CSIS Intelligence Assessment suggests that India interfered in the the Conservative Party’s leadership race in 2022: “CSIS intelligence indicates that the Government of India has engaged in Foreign Interference activities related to the leadership race for a political party in Canada.”

The document stated that an Indian Consulate in Canada “informed a different leadership candidate who was running for the leadership of the same political party that he ‘cannot attend any Indian community events or events hosted by the [Consulate].”

The October 2022 Intelligence Assessment says this leadership candidate had previously taken a policy position contrary to India's interests, which is why India tried to hinder his campaign in the diaspora.”

It goes on: “This example [of election interference] highlights the degree of influence some foreign states can have over diaspora communities, acting as gatekeepers between elected officials and community organizations.”

Earlier today, Prabjot Singh brought the Commission’s attention to an October 31, 2022 CSIS Intelligence Assessment which closely resembles the language reported by Sam Cooper in a section that is heavily redacted stating: “The Government of India (GoI) has engaged in FI activities related to the leadership race for a political party in Canada.” The section ends with “This example serves to highlight the degree of influence some foreign states can have over diaspora communities [redacted].”