Counter-Insurgency as State Policy: A Discussion with Bhai Jaspal Singh Manjhpur
Counter-Insurgency as State Policy: A Discussion with Bhai Jaspal Singh Manjhpur
As the Indian state continues to accelerate the criminalization of dissent across the subcontinent, we spoke with Bhai Jaspal Singh Manjhpur on 8 June to discuss continuities and shifts in Delhi’s strategy to contain and repress Sikh activism in Punjab. This discussion outlines the contours of Indian repression in Punjab, with specific reference to legal mechanisms of oppression, as well as the BJP’s broader—and more sinister—approach to diversity and dissent in the region.
As legal counsel for a number of Sikh political prisoners—and a former political prisoner himself—Bhai Manjhpur has an intimate understanding of the wide array of tools—both legal and extrajudicial—that Indian agencies deploy to clamp down on Sikh naujawan in Punjab. Especially for those of us in the diaspora, having a concrete understanding of realities on the ground in Punjab that is rooted in fact, rather than rhetoric or conspiracy, is pivotal to effectively strategizing the next steps in our ongoing struggle.
The full episode is available here.
Controlling and Eliminating Sikh Dissent Through Colonial Legislation
The conversation provides a comprehensive account of the Indian state’s counter-insurgency operations seen in March this year, but goes much further back to uncover the preparatory work done before this operation as well as past iterations of repressive violence. Bhai Jaspal Singh goes into considerable detail to explain the use and function of the different colonial-era draconian laws India uses to suppress dissent, with specific reference to “751” (107/151 of the Indian Criminal Code Procedure), the National Security Act, and UAPA.
While UAPA has been used excessively against Sikh naujawan to completely cripple their activism and organizational capacity, 751 and the NSA are frequently used as policy tools to disrupt and intimidate political activists to temper their activities within the parameters of Indian nationalism before more drastic action is taken. Bhai Manjhpur provides a number of anecdotes that outline how both 751 and NSA have been used against Sikh naujawan over the years, with specific examples of Sikh activists being detained for the specific purpose of preventing them from attending political rallies, meetings, and other public events. In effect, the ability of security agencies to hold political activists at will under the guise of “preventative detention” significantly inhibits the ability of Sikh naujawan to effectively mobilize and engage in political advocacy within existing institutions.
As both provisions allow considerable flexibility in varying lengths of “preventative detention”, they are used regularly by state officials to facilitate political negotiations and intimidate leaders of various political parties and factions. The NSA, for example, was used after June 1984 against the Akali Dal and other conciliatory factions in order to neutralize demands for Khalistan and facilitate negotiations which ultimately culminated in the Rajiv-Longowal Accord and other initiatives.
With reference to Bhai Manjhpur’s own experiences of activism with the Sikh Students Federation and Shiromani Akali Dal (Panch Pardhani), he talks about how security agencies surveil Sikh activists in Punjab and eventually use anti-terror legislation like UAPA to completely destroy Sikh organizational infrastructure and capacity when the state deems an entity a potent and uncompromising threat. In his case, he was charged on the basis of vague, unsubstantiated allegations of “terrorist financing” although there was clear evidence of where the funds came from and what they were used for: lawyers’ fees for Sikh political prisoners, pensions for the families of shaheeds, and other activities of the political party. By implicating multiple leading figures however, the young organization was undermined and effectively neutralized before it was able to reach its full potential.
Bhai Jaspal Singh’s own personal experience, and his extensive experience litigating UAPA cases, outlines a familiar pattern:
Accused often are not implicated under UAPA to convict them, but to keep them in jail for a long period of time. If police claims that a pistol was recovered from a person and book him under the Arms Act only, the accused may walk out on bail after the first hearing. However, if the accused is booked under UAPA, he/she may have to live behind bars for years.
This was further demonstrated by his in-depth study of UAPA cases in Punjab which revealed the identical nature and process of filing allegations against Sikh activists: stock witnesses used in multiple cases fo a single police station are credited with providing information regarding the links of the accused with foreign Sikhs, and the intention to perpetrate terrorist acts, or procure funding and weapons to do so. The most striking fact however, is that in an overwhelming majority of such cases, no criminal activity even occurs–Sikh naujawan are incarcerated on the basis of hypotheticals, allegations, and possibilities of what could have occurred.
“Deradicalization” Centres: Institutionalizing Surveillance, Harassment, and Intimidation
The discussion also outlines the work done by security and intelligence agencies in the months leading up to March 18, gathering local intelligence in each district of Punjab and compiling lists of targets accordingly. While this tactic is not entirely new, it does merge with the new dynamics of Hindutva-style repression aided by Israeli tech companies and security agencies. While revelations that Bhai Manjhpur is a target of state surveillance, and potentially a victim of the notorious Pegasus software, are not altogether surprising, they are indicative of the increasing sophistication of India’s repressive security apparatus.
As demonstrated by the persecution of Sikh activists using UAPA, security agencies use colonial-era laws to create localized databases of Sikh activists who are then consistently surveilled, harassed, and intimidated to coerce them to abandon their political advocacy. One of the clearest examples of this, is the malicious prosecution of Bhai Manjinder Singh Hussainpura. First arrested in 2010 after filing a formal complaint against police officers who brutalized him and a number of others at a 2009 protest, Bhai Hussainpura was incarcerated until his 2015 acquittal. Upon his release, he continued his community work and began pursuing an MA in Journalism & Mass Communication until he was charged (and eventually acquitted) under UAPA again in 2017. Unfortunately, this case clearly demonstrates how young Sikh activists are surveilled and continually harassed even after being exonerated of criminal charges.
Even more concerning however, is how this unofficial policy is gradually being institutionalized under the guise of a new digital strategy and the establishment of so-called “deradicalization” centres across Punjab. In a 2020 report on these centres, Kamaldeep Singh Brar spoke with a number of naujawan targeted by the new strategy, including a 25-year old from Amritsar who was summoned and told: “not to download some apps or like or comment on separatist posts, they said I can even be booked for sedition for such activity. I promised the police not to do it again.” The report talks about 10 such naujawan who were summoned and ordered to provide photos, fingerprints, copies of their Adhaar card (identity documents), and details of their family. Others had their phones confiscated as well. The father of another naujawan studying in Canada was summoned because his son had liked a post related to Sikhs For Justice’s referendum campaign. He noted: “I assured them that my son will not indulge in any such activity and asked him to stay away from social media. But police was not ready to close this chapter until I paid some bribe to officials…”
In the aftermath of the March operation, Bhai Jaspal Singh noted that between 400-1000 Sikh naujawan have been summoned to police stations across Punjab due to their online advocacy–or simply making passive posts that even implicitly indicate support for the Sikh sangarsh. Based on the first-hand accounts of his clients, Bhai Jaspal Singh outlines how these individuals are summoned to police stations and coerced into agreeing to immediately cease such activity under the threat of being criminally charged or face other vague consequences. In contrast to the hundreds of naujawan whose arrests are clearly documented through an elaborate procedural trail in the courts, this cohort of naujawan remains undocumented due to the lack of any paper trail and the unwillingness of many to come forward.
One of the most startling details of this process is that those targeted are not always necessarily even activists or advocates; simply “liking” or “sympathizing” with certain political ideas is enough to be targeted for intimidation and repression by security agencies.
Political Shifts in the Region and Formulating a Sikh Response
The above demonstrates that there is a very clear methodology through which Indian security forces continue to try to crush Sikh activism and dissent in Punjab whenever it rears its head and before it can transition into a cohesive and effective political movement or organization. While there is clear continuity with the genocidal counter-insurgency policy of the 1990s, which brazenly murdered Sikh guerrillas, supporters, political activists, and family members with impunity, Bhai Jaspal Singh also notes a shift in the BJP’s strategy of dealing with resistance movements and diversity.
This new strategy reveals a marked difference from the past approaches of various Indian administrations and a new sophistication to their repression–favouring targeted assassinations of militant leaders rather than widespread, wanton violence, alongside an increased emphasis on psyops (psychological operations), intimidation, and fomenting internal instability and polarization. Analyzing the Sikh political landscape, Bhai Jaspal Singh indicates that the BJP has been fueling fragmentation and internal conflict amongst Sikh groups in a form of controlled chaos. Specifically referencing developments in the Delhi Sikh Gurdwara Management Committee and Haryana Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee, he notes that by incentivizing internal factionalism, the BJP is able to ensure chaos within the administration of major Sikh institutions while simultaneously holding sway over each faction–and ensuring its indirect control in either scenario.
In these circumstances, Bhai Jaspal Singh concludes by offering some insights to Sikh naujawan based on his own direct experience, as well as that of other Sikh activists. While encouraging naujawan in the diaspora to mobilize locally and carefully understand the geopolitical trends and pressures that are currently impacting politics in Punjab and South Asia, he strongly emphasizes the importance of decentralized panthic leadership rather than hierarchical organizations that operate in a bureaucratic fashion. Not only does this model of organizational structure strengthen our resilience against targeted repression and manufactured chaos, but it exponentially increases our collective capacity as a panth. Rather than insisting on assimilating all panthic jathay (units) and activists into a singular structure or realm of activism, Bhai Manjhpur insists on the importance of developing various streams of parallel movements and structures in different arenas that are simultaneously capable of facilitating effective internal communication and coordination amongst themselves.
Lastly, he urges naujawan able to safely travel to Punjab to do so as often as possible. He notes the importance of naujawan gaining a concrete understanding and familiarity with ground realities in order to firmly root their panthic activism over the long-term rather than being neutralized after short spurts.